We systematically analyze how variations in board independence and ownership concentration and type affect corporate social performance (CSP). Drawing from the agency and stakeholder perspectives, we argue that recognizing differences in the distribution of costs and benefits to shareholders and other stakeholders is crucial to understand what drives CSP. We analyze a large panel of listed firms from around the world and reveal that CSP is positively associated with board independence, but negatively with ownership concentration. We also reveal that the ownership type matters. A key contribution is that we consistently show that firm-level results depend on the business context. Results confirm that CSP is negatively affected more strongly by ownership concentration in settings where formal rules and regulations emphasize the relative importance of shareholders over other stakeholders. However, in the presence of strong informal institutional pressures towards egalitarianism, large owners exercise less pressure to reduce CSP activities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whereas the impact of corporate social performance (CSP) on different measures of future firm performance has been extensively scrutinized, there is still little evidence on the drivers of CSP (see, e.g., the review of Moser and Martin (2012) ). This paper provides a systematic analysis of how variations in board independence, ownership concentration, and ownership type affect the firm's CSP.
First, we establish general theoretical predictions on the relationships between these key mechanisms of governance at the firm level (Adams et al. 2010; Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009; Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010) and CSP. Second, we theorize how formal and informal institutions (Ioannou and Serafeim 2012; Siegel et al. 2011; influence the standpoints that independent directors and large owners have on CSP. We test our theoretical predictions by analyzing a rich international panel of listed firms from multiple industries and use a firm fixed effects approach to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity, an aspect of paramount importance when analyzing CSP.
Theoretically, we argue that the incentives and pressures for independent directors and large owners to engage in CSP-related activities are likely to depend on their decision-making timeframe, potential reputational concerns, and the strength of their focus on the interests of shareholders and a broader set of stakeholders. Furthermore, given that firms are embedded in the business context, we theorize on the interaction between key governance variables and the institutional environment, a crucial aspect for explaining the variation in CSP. Whereas some related previous efforts exist, to the best of our knowledge these have only focused on the link between corporate governance and (certain aspects of) the environmental dimension of CSP (see, e.g., Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; Kock et al. 2012; Walls et al. 2012) . Moreover, these studies generally consider U.S. firms, and restrict their analysis to the manufacturing industry.
In general terms, CSP represents the outcome of a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) operations. Specifically, we adopt Wood's (1991: 693) definition of CSP as "a business organization's configuration of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships."
1 Following this definition, we use a benchmarked CSP measure that reflects a wide variety of social and environmental dimensions.
There exist several channels through which CSP can bring about future benefits for the firm's shareholders and other stakeholders, including sales (Lev et al. 2010) , operational efficiency (Roberts and Dowling 2002; Edmans 2011) , financing (Goss and Roberts 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Cheng et al. 2014 ), access to valuable resources (Waddock and Graves 1997) , attracting and retaining qualified personnel (Turban and Greening 1997; Greening and Turban 2000) , fostering marketing activities (Moskowitz 1972; Fombrun 1996) , gaining social legitimacy (Hawn et al. 2011) , lowering the probability of negative regulatory, legislative and fiscal actions (Freeman 1984; Hillman and Keim 2001; Brown et al. 2006) , and generally improving performance (Eccles et al. 2014; Flammer 2014) .
For these advantages to materialize, firms usually need to adopt a long-term view to investing in CSP (Weigelt and Camerer 1988; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Eccles et al. 2014 ).
CSP maximizing activities respond to internal incentives but also to external pressures from stakeholders and industry competitors (Waddock et al. 2002) . In this sense, CSP is a double-edged sword, given that its benefits are shared among different actors and thus not all advantages flow to shareholders (see Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) ). In this study, we argue that independent directors and large owners have distinct positions relative to CSP given the difference in the distribution of cost and benefits, as well as the various contexts in which the firms are embedded. While the costs of CSP immediately affect shareholder value by reducing the available resources, the benefits usually appear in the long-term and are shared by shareholders, other stakeholders and managers. Furthermore, certain societies incentivize and even expect firms to be a prominent channel for CSP investments, a fact that significantly affects the directors' and owners' behavior. Describing board and ownership influences on CSP by linking the cost side with the long-term benefit side, while also accounting for the institutional context, allows for a better understanding of the drivers of CSP, an open debate and a central topic in the current literature.
Traditionally, scholars have considered several broad perspectives on CSR activities. A first approach, grounded in economics, has taken the perspective that companies should only pursue CSP when doing so maximizes shareholder value (Friedman 1970; Dhaliwal et al. 2011) . Accordingly, maximizing shareholder value is the corporation's sole reason of existence, whereas CSP that follows other stakeholders' objectives may represent a waste of shareholder wealth, as it unnecessarily raises the firm's costs (Friedman 1970; McWilliams and Siegel 2000; Jensen 2002 ).
For CSP to persist when shareholders focus on profit maximization, such activities must either yield sufficient return on investment to shareholders or be able to withstand the disciplining forces within firms and the capital and labor markets outside firms. The separation of ownership and management in public corporations inevitably comes about with information asymmetries, which in conjunction with conflicting preferences between owners and managers can generate various agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993) . It is primarily through agency theory that directing the firm's resources towards CSR activities could be interpreted as an opportunistic behavior that expropriates shareholders (Brammer and Millington 2008) . Corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. independent boards or ownership concentration) are generally in place to minimize the associated agency cost in firms that require costly monitoring (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993) . The agency perspective tends to be more dominant in shareholder-oriented settings, where capital markets value short-term return over long-term returns (Kochhar and David 1996; Teoh et al. 1998) . While the recognition of expenses to shareholders is immediate, the advantages of CSP for shareholders (and other stakeholders) are uncertain and appear in the long run (Weigelt and Camerer 1988; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Eccles et al. 2014) , which may further help to understand the negative view of CSP from an agency perspective.
In contrast to agency theory, Freeman (1984) provides a conceptual framework in support of CSP. According to stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984; Freeman et al. 2007; Freeman et al. 2010 ), firms must satisfy a variety of constituents (e.g. workers, customers, suppliers, local community organizations) who can influence outcomes. A stakeholder approach implies that more resources are allocated to satisfy the long-term needs and demands of legitimate stakeholders than would be necessary to simply retain their willful participation in production activities. Subsequent extensions to stakeholder theory stress the importance of moral and ethical dimensions of CSP, and attempt to make a case for engaging in social activities (Donaldson and Preston 1995) . To a certain extent, this latter view is related to Arrow's (1973) discussion of the morality of social versus production efficiency. Hillman and Keim (2001) argue that a stakeholder approach could lead to increased shareholder wealth because it allows firms to expand the set of value-creating exchanges with customers, suppliers, communities, and employees, beyond what would be possible with interactions limited to market transactions. Interacting with multiple stakeholders and CSP investments are likely to yield returns in the long run (Eccles et al. 2014) . Consequently, the stakeholder perspective puts less focus on the immediate CSP cost effects for shareholders, and instead emphasizes the long-term benefits to all stakeholders (including shareholders). 2 Analyzing environmental issues, Kock et al. (2012) argue that the relatively weaker attention of stakeholders towards firm financial performance explains a potential divergence of interests with respect to environmental activities between managers and stakeholders. In this sense, stakeholders are likely to push managers towards higher environmental standards to the point that it might harm the firm's financial results. A similar argument could be made for more comprehensive measures of CSP, in which external pressure from stakeholders is likely to play a role.
Drawing from the agency and stakeholder perspectives, we theorize on the mechanics of the corporate governance determinants of CSP, a relationship that we also thoroughly empirically scrutinize using a rich panel of firms from around the world. We focus on how changes in firm-level corporate governance factors affect the firm's future CSP. Previous literature has emphasized the importance of the board of directors and the ownership structure as the two key corporate governance mechanisms at the firm level (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Adams et al. 2010; Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009) . Next, in line with comparative corporate governance studies which explain that decision making is embedded in and partly shaped by the institutional context, we also explore how the baseline relationships between firm-level corporate governance and CSP are affected by formal and informal institutional configurations. We distinguish between the two main institutional models of national corporate governance linked to the legal origin (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; ), but we also move beyond this dichotomy to focus on various dimensions of the strength of investor protection, the strength of legal rights, as well as on the degree of egalitarianism and individualism.
Our results reveal that board independence is positively related to CSP, while ownership concentration is negatively related with CSP. In addition, the ownership type matters for CSP. These baseline findings support the idea that independent directors should be seen as agents in their own right, who may pursue their own interests beyond those of shareholders (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Deutsch et al. 2011 ) and whose reputation is exposed to CSP-related scandals (Linck et al. 2009 ). We argue that the negative relation between ownership concentration and CSP could be driven by the idea that CSP benefits might not flow to shareholders in the same extent as costs. Large owners may prefer to invest less in CSP due to the uncertainty in the timeframe and size of CSP benefits (versus the certainty of immediate costs). Furthermore, large owners may be concerned with changes in the power distribution within the firm, as CSP activities could draw power away from them in favor of other stakeholders. Linked to this point, we illustrate that different types of large owners (with different objectives) have different influences on CSP. While foreign blockholders are positively associated with CSP, financial companies' blockholdings have a strong negative relationship with CSP.
An important contribution of this study is that it consistently shows that these firm-level results depend on the business context. Primarily, results confirm that firm-level CSP is negatively affected more strongly by large owners in settings where formal rules and regulations (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1999; Leuz et al. 2003; Aguilera and Jackson 2010) emphasize the relative importance of shareholders over other stakeholders. Also, the same result is found when individualism is high, thus highlighting an important underlying channel of the general positive effect of individualism on CSP, previously documented by Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) . However, in the presence of strong informal institutional pressures towards egalitarian behavior (Schwartz 1994; 2004; Siegel et al. 2011; , large owners exercise less pressure to reduce CSP activities, as the firm is a primary channel for social and environmental investments.
Our work has important academic and policy implications that emerge from a better understanding of the corporate governance drivers of CSP. First, our study adds an important missing picture to the existing literature: a systematic analysis of the firm-level determinants of CSP. We theorize on the mechanics of the corporate governance determinants of CSP in which the distribution of costs and benefits of CSP jointly with elements of external pressure play an important role. While previous research has already established a relationship between board characteristics and some dimensions of CSP, this is the first study to systematically explain the influence of board independence, ownership concentration and ownership type on CSP. Second, our study highlights, theoretically and empirically, the importance of the business environment as an important moderator of the firm-level drivers of CSP. The directors' and owners' interests and the external pressure they may perceive are likely to depend on the business context. Thus, we reveal that the external validity of firm-level findings on drivers of CSP is sometimes limited. Third, our analysis builds on a large international sample of listed firms over the period [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . Our data on CSP come from ASSET4, a Thomson Reuters database created by specially trained research analysts who collect 900 evaluation points per firm-year and produce comparable, benchmarked CSP scores. Another major advance is that this database avoids sample selection biases, a crucial issue for studies of (non-financial) disclosure (Dhaliwal et al. 2012; Ioannou and Serafeim 2012) . Forth, a key feature of our empirical approach is using firm fixed and year effects. The results on the determinants of CSP may well be influenced by unobserved time-constant firm heterogeneity and by potential endogeneity related to systematic shocks that lead to CSP variations in all firms. Controlling for these two aspects is a chief concern in panel data analyses as it provides significant strength to the attained results and is therefore an important advantage of our study. We also test the robustness of our main findings using alternative specifications for our dependent variable and regression models.
The next section develops our hypotheses on the relationship between corporate governance and CSP, and the influence of institutional factors. We then provide an overview of the data gathering procedure, sample description, and methodology. Empirical results are discussed before presenting the concluding remarks jointly with some policy implications, which reveal that an improved understanding of the drivers of CSP is of interest to academics, managers, capital market participants, and regulators.
II. PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The empirical literature on corporate governance has been mostly rooted in agency theory. This stream of research identifies situations in which shareholders' and managers' interests are likely to diverge and proposes mechanisms that can mitigate managers' self-serving behavior (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . The firm-level governance mechanisms that fundamentally shape corporate governance and firm strategic decisions are the board of directors (Dalton et al. 2007 ) and the ownership structure of the firm (Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010). Within these two mechanisms, board independence and ownership concentration and type have been considered most relevant (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993 ).
These internal governance characteristics interact with external institutional mechanisms (Denis and McConnell 2003; Aguilera and Jackson 2010) . In terms of comparative corporate governance, much of the research has focused on the distinction between shareholder-and stakeholder-oriented governance models, the country's legal system as a mechanism to discipline managers (e.g. Leuz et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 2008) , and cultural and ideological differences (Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Siegel et al. 2011; . In addition, following Bebchuk and Hamdani's (2009) suggestion to move beyond a single global governance standard, we analyze the extent to which firm-level drivers depend on the broad institutional context. To this end, we also assess whether the influence of board independence and ownership concentration is contingent on formal and informal institutions.
Board Independence
Boards are the internal governing mechanism that shapes firm governance, given their direct access to the two other axes in the corporate governance triangle: managers and shareholders. The board receives its authority from shareholders of corporations and its job is to hire, fire, compensate, and advise top management on behalf of those shareholders, as well as monitor top management teams to assure that they comply with the existing regulation (Jensen 1993) . In recent years, public pressure and regulatory requirements have led firms to have majority-independent boards, an important issue in most corporate governance practices codes around the world (Krause et al. 2014 ).
Independent directors have incentives to push for more extensive CSP, for at least two reasons.
First, independent directors should be regarded as agents in their own right (Deutsch et al. 2011 shareholders' interests, they may also pursue the interest of a larger set of stakeholders. Accordingly, Lorsch and MacIver (1989) , who survey directors in S&P firms, find that the majority of independent directors consider themselves accountable to stakeholders more than to shareholders. To the extent that independent directors have a stronger focus on stakeholder interests compared to executives, who may be under greater pressure to attend shareholder interest, we would expect a positive relationship between board independence and CSP. In addition, the board is charged with the long-term strategic direction of the firm and this extended timeframe for decision making may further enhance CSP, whose benefits usually appear in the long run.
Second, while all board members share the same duty of care, corporate scandals are likely to draw public attention to the shortcomings of independent board members, which could affect their reputation and legitimacy (Linck et al. 2009 ). By pursuing higher levels of CSP, independent directors are able to gain legitimacy and protect their reputation (without bearing the investment cost). In a similar vein, previous studies have shown that independent boards generally support policies that ensure higher financial transparency (Gul and Leung 2004; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Lim et al. 2007 ) and are associated with higher levels of audit services (O'Sullivan 2000; Carcello et al. 2002) .
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Board independence is positively related to CSP.
Ownership Concentration and Blockholder Type
Shareholder control is an internal governance mechanism which can range from a sole majority owner to numerous small shareholders. Differences in ownership structure have two obvious consequences for corporate governance (Morck et al. 2005) . On the one hand, large shareholders possess both the incentives and the power to influence management. On the other hand, large shareholders can create conditions for a new problem, because their interests and those of minority shareholders may not be aligned.
We hypothesize that ownership concentration is likely to be related to lower levels of CSP for at least two reasons. First, following the agency perspective, to the extent that the CSP benefits might not flow to shareholders to the same extent as the costs, large owners would have incentives (and the ability) to reduce CSP-related activities (Burkhart et al. 1997; Demsetz et al. 1997) . In general, more ownership concentration is related to less managerial discretion, and thus it restricts the resources that managers likely direct to CSP (Aragón-Correa and Sharma 2003). Second, while CSP yields benefits to shareholders and other stakeholders, CSP investments are potentially reshaping the power distribution between the CEO, shareholders and among different stakeholder groups within an organization. We therefore assume that CSP is likely to draw power away from large shareholders in favor of other stakeholders and management. From the above perspectives, a negative relationship would be expected. 3 Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2a: Ownership concentration is negatively related to CSP.
When studying ownership structure it is crucial to distinguish between different types of large shareholders (Mehran 1995; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Adams et al. 2011 ). This is so because different types of owners pursue different objectives, which in turn is likely to influence their preferences towards CSP. Owners can be classified into different categories. Prior research (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Barca and Becht 2001) distinguish between families, corporations, and financial companies. State and foreign ownership may also become relevant owners, depending on the context (Pedersen and Thomsen 1997) .
We believe that there is an important distinction in the timeframe of investment and the focus on shareholder value orientation between different types of blockholders. In particular, financial companies (especially investment funds) are likely to have a strong focus on short-term shareholder value maximization compared to any other owner type. We would therefore expect that larger proportions of financial ownership lead to lower CSP compared to any other type of owner. Corporate and family owners are likely to focus on resource allocation for maximizing shareholder value (an argument that could work against broad CSP investments), but their positions are also related to long term strategic investments, which is an argument in favor of CSP. Perhaps more importantly, family owners have access to other channels, outside the company, to engage in social activities. The example of Microsoft and Bill Gates may serve to illustrate this point. Family owners may also become under greater scrutiny (and greater pressure) from other investors if they direct the firm towards high levels of CSP. Finally, firms with large proportions of foreign owners (potentially for strategic reasons) and state ownership are likely to exhibit higher levels of CSP. This is so because, on the one hand, foreign investors may be under greater public scrutiny in their relations with stakeholders in a foreign setting, and may gain legitimacy through CSP. On the other hand, the objectives of the state are likely to focus on the welfare of a broader set of stakeholders. Taking these arguments together, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2b: Ownership concentration of financial companies, corporations and families is negatively related to CSP, while concentration of foreign and state ownership is positively related to
CSP.
Formal and Informal Institutions
Board independence and ownership concentration represent internal firm mechanisms that interact with the external business environment (Denis and McConnell 2003; Aguilera and Jackson 2010) . In this sense, corporate governance is an institutional element of country-level business systems and thus reflects economic and social structures and norms of key stakeholders in a society (Whitley 1999 ). The comparative corporate governance literature has identified two main institutional models that explain cross-national differences: the shareholder-and stakeholder-orientations (Aguilera and Unlike the shareholder-oriented system, the stakeholder-oriented system, also referred to as insider, bank-oriented model, features debt financing, owners concentration, and tightly interconnected networks among firms, their trading partners, and financial institutions in which interactions are relational.
Previous studies have started to explore a direct relationship between the institutional setting and CSP. We first revise the main arguments used to justify this relationship before exploring why the relationship between firm-level governance and CSP is likely to be shaped by the institutional context.
In shareholder-oriented systems, financing decisions by the markets are based to a greater extent on short-term profitability (Kochhar and David 1996; Teoh et al. 1998 ). This preference towards shorttermism is likely to limit investments in CSP, since the benefits from such activities usually materialize in the long run (Weigelt and Camerer 1988; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Eccles et al. 2014 ). Additionally, external pressure from stakeholders to invest in CSP is expected to be weaker in shareholder-oriented societies, where firms are understood to primarily attend shareholders' interests.
Moreover, in a context where transactions are market-based, CSP may receive less support compared to a setting with relational transactions based on a longer time horizon, mutual trust and cooperation (Cheng et al. 2011) . Due to these different contextual pressures, the benefits of CSP may also be different. This would affect the incentives to pursue social and environmental investments through the firm, which may be a predominant channel in stakeholder societies, while in shareholder societies multiple channels could be employed as illustrated via the example of Microsoft. Finally, the search for legitimacy through CSP is likely to be stronger in stakeholder-oriented context (Aguilera and
Jackson 2003).
To separate shareholder-from stakeholder-oriented societies, previous studies have mostly relied on the legal origin of countries. 4 However, the evidence on the effect of legal origin on CSP is mixed. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find that firms in civil law (i.e. stakeholder-oriented) countries are more likely to publish a standalone CSR report. In contrast, Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) find that European firms from shareholder-oriented economies present higher levels of CSR activities, compared to firms from stakeholder-oriented economies. They argue that voluntary CSR activities in liberal, shareholder-oriented economies act as a substitute for institutionalized forms of stakeholder participation, whereas in stakeholder economies CSR activities often have more implicit forms.
However, it is important to move beyond the dichotomous division restricted to legal traditions, as every country designs legal rules and regulations to protect shareholders from corporate insiders investing in projects or activities that would benefit themselves or other stakeholders instead of the shareholders (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; . A key institutional determinant of these corporate policy choices is the level of investor protection (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1999; Leuz et al. 2003) . We would expect that in countries where laws and regulations emphasize the protection of shareholders' interests, in line with the theory of the firm, managerial incentives to pursue CSP are significantly lowered, as these could be perceived as rent-seeking behavior. In contrast, if the society has a stakeholder approach to the firm, we would expect managers to be more motivated to invest in CSP, and shareholders to exert less pressure to reduce these investments.
Empirically, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) examine the importance of laws that limit selfdealing of corporate insiders, which is one of the four components of the political system they consider, are associated with lower CSP. Given that legal protection against self-dealing by large shareholders is only one aspect of minority shareholder protection, our focus is on a broader measure of shareholder protection. We argue that strong and well-enforced investor rights are an indication of the society's perception that the firm's resources should be managed in the interest of shareholders, and consequently these rights reduce insiders' incentives to invest in CSP.
To better understand how the institutional context influences CSP, we believe that it is important to consider the underlying channels, of which firm-level governance is likely to be an important one. Using the institutional-level reasoning jointly with our predictions on internal mechanisms, we theorize that institutional factors may significantly influence the attitudes of independent directors and large owners towards CSP. On the one hand, the independent directors' concerns for legitimacy and reputation with respect to broad categories of shareholders (Linck et al. 2009 ) may be reduced when the firm operates in a shareholder-oriented environment (i.e. lower incentives). In addition, the importance of the board and independent directors as well as the role they see for themselves towards shareholders and stakeholders is likely to be context dependent. In this respect, Desender et al. (2013) suggest that the role of the board may be enhanced in shareholderoriented environments, in part because of the absence of other governance mechanisms like monitoring by large owners or banks. Furthermore, independent directors in stakeholder-oriented environments may give more importance to a broad set of stakeholder compared to independent directors in shareholder-oriented environments. Thus, the interaction between board independence and a shareholder-oriented environment includes both positive and negative effects on CSP.
On the other hand, shareholder-oriented environments would enhance the theorized negative relation between ownership concentration and CSP. Large owners' incentives and ability to reduce investments such as the ones in CSP, which have shared benefits with other stakeholders (Burkhart et al. 1997; Demsetz et al. 1997) , are higher in shareholder-oriented institutional settings. Therefore, owners with strategic holdings have more legal and overall market support to maintain the power distribution within the firm and invest less in CSP. Using these arguments jointly, the interaction between ownership concentration and shareholder-orientation would be negatively related to CSP.
Hypothesis 3a: The positive relationship between board independence and CSP is weaker in
shareholder-oriented societies.
Hypothesis 3b: The negative relationship between ownership concentration and CSP is stronger in shareholder-oriented societies.
Jointly with formal institutions, informal institutions shape managerial actions and discretion (North 1991; Williamson 2000; Licht 2001; Crossland and Hambrick 2011) . Whitley (1999: 51) states that "the norms governing trust and authority relations are crucial because they structure exchange relationships between business partners and between employers and employees. They also affect the development of collective identities and prevalent modes of eliciting compliance and commitment within authority systems." This is in line with Licht's (2001) idea that national culture systems broadly influence the role and responsibility of corporations in the society at large. Moreover, different cultural systems have generated diverse assumptions about society, business and government (Matten and Moon 2008) . Continental European societies have developed a greater cultural reliance on organizations, while in the U.S. there is a strong ethic of stewardship in which businessmen and corporations consider only surplus revenues as trust funds that should be administered in the interest of the community (see Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and the related review in Matten and Moon (2008) ).
We could therefore expect that cultural traits will also impact the incentives of independent directors and large owners towards CSP, as well as the external pressure they may perceive.
One such fundamental element of the cultural system is egalitarianism, defined as the belief that all people are of equal worth and should thus be treated equally in the society (Schwartz 1994; 2004) .
Egalitarianism also stands for the corresponding cultural orientation in the Schwartz model, and includes values as equality, social justice, responsibility, helpfulness, and honesty. An egalitarian society is characterized by a certain lack of tolerance for abuses of power (market and political), but also by a wide range of social and economic policy choices, including distributions and regulations that protect the indigent, the unemployed, the retired, and the elderly (Siegel et al. 2011; . In egalitarian societies, there may be a greater need for legitimacy through CSP, and thus large shareholders may be less likely to focus exclusively on (short term) shareholder value and push less strongly for lower levels of CSP. One could argue that egalitarian societies perceive and value corporations according to characteristics more specific to "persons" than firms in traditional market economies. We expect an egalitarian context to especially influence firms' shareholders. Regarding board independence, since egalitarian societies may stimulate the protection of a broader set of stakeholders, the potential loss of reputation may be a relevant concern for independent directors.
However, the same arguments would also apply to other board members or executives, and therefore, a greater level of board independence may not necessarily have a stronger impact on CSP when egalitarianism is higher. Given the particular characteristics described above, we hypothesize that large owners will exercise less pressure to reduce CSP investments when acting in egalitarian societies.
Hypothesis 4a: In egalitarian societies ownership concentration is less negatively related to CSP.
Approaching the relationship between the cultural system and CSP through the egalitarianism dimension is novel. To better integrate our study in the existing literature, we also test whether Hofstede's (1980; more traditional concept of individualism affects the relationship between firm-level corporate governance and CSP. In their nation-level study, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) hypothesize that there is a positive link between individualism and CSP. Nevertheless, the documented general positive effect of individualism on CSP can interact in different ways with the internal corporate governance mechanisms. Individualism is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups, thus revealing how people socialize and collaborate (Hofstede1980). Moreover, Matten and Moon (2008) highlight that individualistic societies allow for more discretion of economic actors. An individualistic informal institutional environment is especially relevant when owners have important stakes at it is likely to impact the overall influence of large owners on decision making in general and CSP in particular. Taking these arguments jointly, we hypothesize that when the environment favors unilateral decision making and economic discretion, the negative relationship between ownership concentration and CSP is stronger.
Hypothesis 4b: The negative relationship between ownership concentration and CSP is stronger in individualistic societies.
III. METHODOLOGY Sample and Data
We construct our sample by combining and matching several databases. We obtain environmental, social and economic metrics from Thomson Reuters ASSET4, which specializes in providing objective, relevant, auditable and systematic CSP information to professional investors.
Regarding our corporate governance variables, we obtain detailed board composition data from
Thomson Reuters ASSET4 and ownership data from Thomson One Banker. We collect stock market data from Datastream and accounting data from Worldscope. The nation-level variables come from multiple sources, including the World Bank, Schwartz (1994; 2004) , Siegel et al. (2011; and Hofstede (1980; . We restrict our sample to those countries with at least 50 firm-year observations. Our final sample includes a total of 11,163 firm-year observations from 27 countries over the period 2002-2012.
Regression Models
We estimate firm fixed effects panel data regressions. In the presence of unobserved firm fixed effects, using panel fixed effects is a crucial aspect to control for unobserved time-constant firm heterogeneity. In addition to firm fixed effects, we include year dummies to control for potential endogeneity related to systematic shocks that lead to CSP variations in all firms. One can assume the following general specification for firms i = 1,…,N observed at time periods t = 1, …,T:
where CSP it is the dependent variable, thought to be explained by a vector of corporate governance variables (CG it-1 ) through the parameters β that are estimated. Firm and time varying controls (Ctrl it-1 ) are included jointly with a firm fixed effect (ν i ), a time-specific effect (ψ t ) and an idiosyncratic error term (ε it ).
A second model considers the interactions between firm-level corporate governance variables and the formal and informal institutional variables at country-level that are thought to affect CSP.
The robustness of our main findings is tested using alternative specifications for our dependent variable and regression models. We present the details of the alternative specifications and their results in the discussion section.
Variables

Dependent Variable: Measuring CSP and the ASSET4 Dataset
Constructing a truly representative measure of CSP is challenging for a number of reasons.
First, it concerns a theoretical construct which is multidimensional. Second, measurements of a single aspect of CSP (e.g. corporate philanthropy) provide a limited perspective on firm performance in the more general social and environmental sense (Lydenberg et al. 1986; Wolfe and Aupperle 1991) . In this regard, Waddock and Graves (1997: 304) are assessed.
After gathering the CSR data, the analysts transform it into consistent units to allow quantitative analysis of this qualitative information. Indicatively, to name just a few of the major elements considered, we note that: (1) for environmental factors the data typically include information on energy used, water recycled, CO2 emissions, waste recycled, environmental R&D and product innovation, efficiency policies, green material and buildings, biodiversity, ISO and other quality standards, and spills and pollution controversies; and (2) for social factors the data mainly include customer and product responsibility, total quality management, technology know-how sharing, litigation on socially sensitive issues, community reputation, donations, diversity policies, employee turnover, injury rate, accidents, training hours, women employees, donations, and health and safety controversies.
According to Thomson Reuters ASSET4, every data point question goes through a multi-step verification and process control, which includes a series of data entry checks, automated quality rules and historical comparisons to ensure a high level of accuracy, timeliness and quality. Subsequently, these 900 data points are used as inputs to a default equal-weighted framework to calculate 250 key performance indicators and further organize those in 18 categories within four pillars: (1) social performance, (2) environmental performance, (3) corporate governance, and (4) economic performance. For every year, a firm receives a z-score for each of the pillars, benchmarking its performance with the rest of the universe of firms covered by ASSET4. We use the social and environmental metrics to construct a composite CSP index. Following the convention established by Waddock and Graves (1997) , Hillman and Keim (2001) , Waldman et al. (2006) and Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) , among others, we assign equal importance to each of these two pillars.
Independent Variables: Measuring Corporate Governance and Institutions
Board of Directors. We define board independence as the percentage of independent board members as reported by the company (Carcello et al. 2002; Hay et al. 2006) . We restrict our sample to firms with a one-tier board structure (i.e., we eliminate all firms with a supervisory board) to more accurately evaluate the effect of (changes in) board independence, given that in dual board structures boards are exclusively composed of non-executives.
Ownership Concentration. We use the total stake of all blockholders (i.e. shareholders with at least five percent of shares) to account for the ownership concentration (similar to La Porta et al.
(1999) or Faccio et al. (2001) Leuz et al. 2003) . First, common/civil law takes a value of one if the country has a common law (shareholder-oriented) tradition and zero if the country has a civil law (stakeholderoriented) tradition. Second, we employ the strength of investor protection, the ease of shareholder suit, the ease of director liability and the strength of legal rights indices provided by the World Bank. For each of these variables we create a dummy variable that splits the sample according to the median value.
Informal Institutions. We focus on the egalitarianism dimension from the culture framework developed by Schwartz (1994; 2004) , and the individualism dimension from Hofstede's (1980; framework. Egalitarianism is the belief that all people are of equal worth and should be treated equally in society, emphasizing the transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others (Schwartz 2004) . Individualism is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups and their tolerance to unilateral decision making, thus revealing how people socialize and collaborate (Hofstede 1980) . For both variables we create a dummy variable that splits the sample according to the median value.
Control Variables
For firm-level controls, prior CSR research has consistently found size to be an important . On the one hand, larger and more profitable firms have more resources to devote to CSR. In addition, large, profitable firms are also more likely to attract public and regulatory attention and may therefore use CSP to appease activists and regulators. On the other hand, firms with higher leverage are more likely to come under scrutiny from the providers of external finance which may exercise pressure to reduce the resources allocated to pursuing CSP. In addition to these controls, we employ firm and year fixed effects. Figure 1 illustrates the mean-level evolution of our dependent variable and its two pillars over the studied period. Note that our focus on the composite index is supported by the similar trend of the social and environmental scores, and the overall measure (see also their individual correlations with the CSP index, which are of approximately 95% in Table 3 ). The salient increasing trend before 2006, followed by a decrease until 2009 and a return to mean levels in 2012, may suggest a link between the resources firms dedicate to CSP and the level of economic uncertainty.
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
Descriptive Overview
[ Figure 1 and Table 1 about here] Next, Table 1 provides an overview of all variables used in the regression analyses, starting with the firm-level variables. On average, about 66 percent of the board members are independent.
Following, the ownership variables focus on the total blockholder stake (strategic holdings is about 25 percent), accounting for concentration. When decomposing strategic holdings, companies and investment companies emerge as the predominant type of blockholders in our sample, with roughly 6 and 14 percent of average holdings, respectively.
[ Tables 2 and 3 about here]
Institutional variables can be reviewed using Tables 1 and 2 jointly. There are two categories of institutional variables, capturing formal (La Porta et al. 1999; Leuz et al. 2003 ) and informal institutional aspects (Schwartz 1994; 2004; Hofstede 1980; . First, Table 2 reveals how our 27 countries are distributed across the common and civil law systems. Moving beyond the legal origin dichotomy, we introduce formal institutional elements related to investors' protection, the ease of shareholder suit, the ease of director liability and the enforcement of legal rights. These scores are defined on a scale of zero to ten, have average values of 7. 61, 7.97, 7.21 and 8.62, respectively, and are better illustrated at country-level (Table 2 ). The second category specifies the measures of informal institutions-egalitarianism (Schwartz 1994; 2004) and individualism (Hofstede 1980;  2001)-to show the society's approach to the balance of selfish interests and voluntary commitment towards the welfare of others (Tables 1 and 2 ). To set the ground for the hypotheses' tests, Table 3 presents the correlations among all the employed variables. Table 4 presents the results of the firm-level governance determinants of CSP. Specification (1) shows a significant positive coefficient for board independence, thus providing support to our first hypothesis. A one standard deviation change in board independence is associated with a change in CSP of 1.9 percent (compared to the mean value). This result underscores the idea that independent directors should be understood as agents in their own right, who consider a broader range of stakeholder interests (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Deutsch et al. 2011) . It is also consistent with previous studies that show independent boards to be associated with higher financial transparency (Gul and Leung 2004; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Lim et al. 2007 ) and higher audit fees (O'Sullivan 2000; Carcello et al. 2002) . Independent directors may also push for higher CSP-related activities if their timeframe for decision making is more long term oriented compared to the timeframe of executive directors. Furthermore, independent board members' reputation is more exposed to CSPrelated scandals (Linck et al. 2009 ). All these aspects provide support to our findings. In contrast to our results, Kock et al. (2012) report a negative relationship between board independence, which they employ as a control variable, and waste emissions.
Board independence, ownership concentration and blockholder type
Next, specification (2) looks at the relationship between the total stake held by strategic owners and CSP. The coefficient is negative and significant, which is in line with our hypothesis 2a that postulates a negative relationship between powerful shareholders within the organization and the allocation of resources to CSP. This result corroborates the findings of Burkhart et al. (1997) and Demsetz et al. (1997) who show that ownership concentration is a fundamental aspect of corporate governance that helps to explain strategic decisions in general and, in our particular case, the variation of CSP with the firm. Given the uncertainty of the timeframe and the size of CSP benefits (versus the certainty of costs), large owners may prefer to invest less in CSP. Additionally, CSP activities potentially draw power away from strategic shareholders in favor of other stakeholders and managers.
[ Table 4 about here]
In specification (3), we introduce both test variables simultaneously and find consistent results, with very similar coefficients for board independence and ownership concentration. Specification (4) examines the interaction between board independence and ownership concentration. In the presence of high strategic holdings, the positive influence of board independence on CSP could disappear due to higher scrutiny from large owners. This may well mean that when ownership concentration is high, the independent board members' concerns for reputation towards broader categories of stakeholders (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Linck et al. 2009 ) is forgone in favor of strategic owners' preferences for lower CSP investments. In this case it is probable that firms in which strategic owners have higher degrees of control, the discretion for decision making is limited (Aragón-Correa and Sharma 2003), as the power structure within the company is more closely defined by the dominant shareholders. In line with this reasoning, our results reveal an overall positive effect of board independence which is reduced as strategic holdings grow larger. When strategic holdings is low (Q1), the overall effect of board independence is close to 0.9, while this effects is reduced to 0.6 and 0.4 for higher levels of strategic holdings (Q2 and Q3, respectively).
To test hypothesis 2b, we decompose ownership concentration into blockholder types. Several researchers (e.g. Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Adams et al. 2011) , call for a distinction between types of blockholders when studying ownership structure because different types of owners pursue different strategic objectives, and thus can be expected to exert different effects on managers. We disaggregate our measure of total blockholdings into financial companies, corporations, families, foreign and state ownership. We find partial support for hypothesis 2b. The parameters' signs are in line with our theoretical predictions, however the only significant coefficients appear for foreign blockholders and financial companies. The positive and significant association of CSP and foreign ownership is consistent with the need of legitimization of foreign investors and higher scrutiny by the public especially when their stakes are large (Pedersen and Thomsen 1997) . On a related note, state (government) blockholders would also support CSP investments due to their usual focus on the welfare of a broader set of stakeholders. Although the parameter sign is positive, this effect is not significant.
In contrast, ownership concentration of financial companies is negatively related to CSP. The higher and significant coefficient of financial companies' holdings upholds our conjecture that a larger proportion of this type of owners leads to lower CSP to a larger extent than any other type of owner. This is probably so given that financial companies (especially investment funds) focus more on shortterm value maximization. Similarly, corporation and family shareholders, although more long-term oriented than financial companies, manage the allocation of resources more closely when they have substantial power in the firm. Nevertheless, while their coefficients are negative, there is no significant effect, which may be due to the mixed effects of a longer timeframe for decision making (in favor of CSP investments) and the closer control of resource allocation (against CSP investments).
Alternatively, family and company blockholdings are the categories, together with state ownership, with lower levels of variation, which may lead to our non-significant finding.
Overall, our results provide strong support to the idea that while independent directors owe their duties to the company as a whole and to shareholders, they consider themselves accountable to stakeholders, and support (long-term) CSP investments. In contrast, ownership concentration is linked to lower CSP, which may be explained by the uncertainty of CSP benefits and the potential shifts in the power distribution within the firm. This latter point is well illustrated when decomposing by type of blockholders who pursue different objectives that are likely to influence their preferences towards CSP.
Formal and Informal Institutions: Firm-level results in context
Since we are analyzing a panel of firms from all over the world, the interactions of board independence and ownership concentration with the external business environment are of special interest. We operationalize the shareholder-and stakeholder-oriented business systems that reflect economic and social structures and norms in a society according to the established national-level institutional models (Whitley 1999; Aguilera and Jackson 2003; . We first focus on the importance of the legal origin to examine how the influence of firm-level governance on CSP levels differs in shareholder-and stakeholder-oriented societies. While the signs of the coefficients for the main effects as well as the interaction terms are in line with hypotheses 1 and 2a, we do not find support for hypotheses 3a and 3b (Table 5 , specification (1)). However, when we separate firms according to broader institutional proxies for shareholder-and stakeholder-orientations, instead of limiting ourselves to the usual legal origin dichotomy, results become significant.
[ Table 5 about here] Specifications (2) to (5) in Table 5 interact the two main firm-level variables (board independence and ownership concentration) with environments that show high investor protection, high ease of shareholder suit, high ease of director liability, and high strength of legal rights, respectively. Using dummy variables that split our sample according to the median value, we are able to compare the influence of board independence and ownership concentration when these values are high, relative to when they are low. We consistently find, across all four specifications, a strong negative effect of ownership concentration on CSP, when firms operate in a shareholder-oriented
context. This provides robust support to hypothesis 3b. Large owners face less pressure to invest in CSP in shareholder-oriented societies, leading to a higher likelihood of large owners to influence executives and act more conservatively with respect to long-term CSP investments.
As expected, shareholder-oriented institutional configurations can enhance the large owners'
incentives and ability to reduce investments in CSP, which have shared benefits with various stakeholders (Burkhart et al. 1997; Demsetz et al. 1997) . Therefore, owners with strategic holdings have more legal and overall market support to maintain the power distribution within the firm and invest less in CSP. At the same time, the separated effects of board independence in stakeholder-and shareholder-oriented environments, although always positive, are not significant. In this sense, the concerns of independent directors for their reputation and legitimacy with respect to broader categories of stakeholders (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Linck et al. 2009 ) are less likely to be diminished by the regulations and norms favoring shareholders.
It is thus crucial to cautiously interpret firm-level results from this and previous studies, as these depend on the business context. One important advantage of our approach is that it accounts for firm fixed effects, and therefore reflects how within firm variations of our governance variables are associated with CSP. Our results provide relevant insights related to the finding of Dhaliwal et al. (2012) that CSP is negatively related to shareholder-oriented environments, in which there is a greater tendency to base decisions on short-term profitability (Kochhar and David 1996; Teoh et al. 1998 ).
When we examine in detail the relationship between CSP and the interactions of firm-level corporate governance with the shareholder protection in different countries (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1999; Leuz et al. 2003) , results confirm that firm-level CSP is significantly affected by large owners in settings where rules and regulations emphasize the relative importance of shareholders over other stakeholders.
Having established the influence of formal institutions, we now move to analyze how informal institutions moderate the relationship between firm-level corporate governance and CSP. Informal institutions are expected, in broad terms, to influence the rules of the game and shape business actions (North 1991; Williamson 2000; Crossland and Hambrick 2011) , and-perhaps more importantly for our study-their influence is expected to differ across countries and shareholder-and stakeholderoriented environments (Matten and Moon 2008) . Accordingly, specification (6) in Table 5 reveals that valuing equity amongst people (Schwartz 1994; 2004) significantly affects the relationship between ownership concentration and CSP. Given the characteristics of an egalitarian society, which acts against potential abuses of power and values a wide range of social and economic policy choices, large owners face increased pressure in favor of CSP investments. These findings provide support to hypothesis 4a and corroborate Siegel et al.'s (2011; viewpoint that egalitarian societies value firms using rationales well beyond the neoclassical shareholder maximization approach. Thus, in this type of institutional context large owners will exercise less pressure to reduce CSP activities, as the firm is a primary channel for social and environmental investments.
To better integrate these results in the existing literature-given that using the egalitarianism measure is novel-we test how informal institutions measured through Hofstede's (1980; more traditional concept of individualism moderates the relationship between firm-level corporate governance and CSP. Specification (7) in Table 5 In general, our findings on the interaction between firm-level corporate governance and formal and informal institutions reveal the importance of the business context for strategic decision making such as CSP investments. By using a firm fixed effects approach, we are able to show which types of institutional environments significantly affect the general relationships between firm-level corporate governance and CSP. The essential takeaway is that, especially for international panel data analyses, it is vital to consider the boundary effects of general firm-level hypotheses. For instance, salient results indicate that hypothesis 2a (ownership concentration is negatively related to CSP) is significantly stronger in shareholder-oriented formal institutional contexts and informal individualistic environments, while the opposite is true in egalitarian societies.
Robustness Analysis
To provide further robustness to our results we perform a number of tests related to the dependent variable and to the methodology. First, we verify that our results hold if we use a broader definition of CSP that incorporates the economic pillar to the social and environmental pillars. The economic pillar reflects client loyalty, shareholder loyalty and firm performance. Specifications (1), (2) and (3) in Table 6 replicate our main analyses for board independence and ownership concentration and type using this broader definition of the dependent variable. The results are essentially unchanged.
[ Table 6 about here] Second, we repeat our analysis using OLS with time, industry and country fixed effects for the influence of board independence, ownership concentration and type on CSP. Specifications (4), (5) and (6) show similar results for board independence and ownership concentration, although the magnitudes of the effects are larger. Regarding the influence of different types of blockholders, the signs of all types remain the same, but all the coefficients are now significant. Additionally, following
Petersen (2009) and Gow et al. (2010) who indicate that clustering errors at firm level (as we do in the previous models) may not always lead to accurate results, we also cluster by firm and year, or country and year when calculating the robust standard errors. As common practice suggests (e.g. Dhaliwal et al. 2012) , the different clustering levels are also defined for OLS regressions with industry, country and year fixed effects. For all cases, the tenor of our results does not change, and, overall, these additional analyses provide further support to our results.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Given the growing attention to CSP, it is crucial to better understand its firm-level drivers. The objective of this study is to analyze how variations in board independence and ownership concentration and type affect the firm's CSP. We theorize on the relation between corporate governance and CSP, and the underlying influences exerted by formal and informal institutions.
Analyzing a rich panel of listed firms from around the world, our results confirm the theoretical baseline predictions for the firm-level governance determinants of CSP. Furthermore, we consistently show that it is essential to cautiously interpret firm-level results from this and previous research, as these depend on the business context.
We show that board independence is positively related to within-firm variations of CSP, while ownership concentration is negatively related with firm-level CSP variations. To a certain extent, our findings indicate that independent directors should be understood as agents in their own right, not only focused on shareholder interests but on a larger set of stakeholders (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Deutsch et al. 2011) , and concerned with their reputation (Linck et al. 2009 ). Additionally, large shareholders restrict the allocation of resources to CSP, which we argue may reflect the dissimilar timeframe of costs and benefits of CSP, but also the possible shifts in the power distribution within the firm (e.g. Burkhart et al. 1997; Demsetz et al. 1997) . To provide further insights into this finding, we classify large owners according to type and reveal how the various types of large owners have different influences on CSP. Most importantly, foreign ownership concentration is positively associated with CSP, while financial companies' blockholdings have a strong negative relationship with CSP.
A key contribution is that we demonstrate that firm-level results depend on the business context, by showing that formal and informal of institutions significantly moderate the relationship between firm-level corporate governance and CSP. The essential takeaway is that, especially for international panel data analyses, it is vital to consider the boundary effects of firm-level hypotheses explaining CSP. A salient finding is that ownership concentration negatively affects CSP more strongly when formal rules and regulations (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; La Porta et al. 1999; Leuz et al. 2003; Aguilera and Jackson 2010) emphasize the relative importance of shareholders over other stakeholders. This is consistent with the idea that in shareholder-oriented societies decisions rely more on short-term profitability objectives (Kochhar and David 1996; Teoh et al. 1998) , while CSP benefits are uncertain, based on long-term strategies and linked to stakeholders' pressure. Moreover, the same result holds when informal institutions allow for more discretion of economic actors (i.e. high individualism) (Hofstede 1980; Matten and Moon 2008) . This result provides interesting insights into the basic positive relationship between individualism and CSP, previously documented by Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) . In contrast, when informal institutions exert strong pressures towards egalitarian behavior (Schwartz 1994; 2004; Siegel et al. 2011; , large owners exercise less pressure to reduce CSP activities. It thus seems that stakeholder-oriented societies view the firm as an important channel for CSP investments, while in shareholder-oriented environments other channels may also be adequate.
Overall, our work has important academic and policy implications that emerge from a better understanding of the corporate governance drivers of CSP. There are limitations to our study. As it tends to be the case for metrics used in existing literature, the CSP scores provided by Thomson Reuters ASSET4 are an imperfect measure. Similar to the studies of Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) or Cheng et al. (2014) , we would like to remark that CSP scores could be noisy to the extent in which they do not capture some impacts of CSR activities. However, given the rigorous approach used for constructing the ASSET4 database, we believe these neglected aspects to be minimal. Also, given that ASSET4 data refer to publicly traded firms, our results are more relevant for these types of organizations than for privately owned firms (see Serafeim (2012) or Cheng et al. (2014) ). This limitation is important if public and private corporations respond to organizational and institutional incentives in significantly different ways. Future research could investigate whether corporate governance drivers are different between listed and non-listed firms. Finally, our sample mostly includes firms from developed markets. It would be interesting to see whether our results hold for a larger sample of firms from emerging markets. (2) in Section III). Dependent variable CSP index (social and environmental scores). Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. is the CSP index including the social, environmental and economic dimensions for models (1) to (3) (fixed effects panel data regressions), and the CSP index based on social and environmental dimensions for models (4) to (6) (OLS regressions). Robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
